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tory classification. It finds an application when some questions
auxiliary to the trial, and preliminary to the substantive matter of
the suit arises and is addressed to the court.' In such cases the
oath of the party is received ;, as his affidavit of his inability to
attend trial, or of the materiality or diligent search made for a witness, or a paper. So in numerous similar cases. So if a party has
lost a deed, or other material evidence, out of hs own custody, and
he can lay a foundation for his own oath, by showing aliunde that
such document existed, he will be allowed to testify as to the aircumstances and fact of the loss.
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1. It is necessary that each point submitted to the court, if relevant and material to
the issue, be substantially auswer d in the relation in which it was put. It is
not quite enough that an answer may be deduced from observations in other connections and relations to other facts.
2. The law implies in the contract of carrying passengers by railroad' companies,
that they shall provide & safe and sufficient road and cars, competent and careful
11
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secondary evidence. Jugan vs. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662; 3 Phillips Ev., C. & Hill's
Notes, 128-9; ante, j 14, 15, notes; Vandu vs. Williams, 6 Deniao, 66.
3 C. & Hill's notes to 1 Phillips' Evid. 452 and 69, n. 122; 1 Greenleaf's Evid.
58, 549; Riggs vs. Taylor, 9 Wheaton, 486; Taunton Bank vs. Richardson, 5 Pick.
436; Page vs. Page, 15 Pick. 868-876; Chamberlain vs. Gorham, 20 Johns. 144;
contra, Coleman vs. Wolcott, 4 Day, 888; See V. vs. W., &Denio, 65.

So a female

in prosecution for bastardy, may testify to acts within her own exclusive knowledge.
Devine vs. Stimpson, 2 Mass. 44t; Mariner vs. Dyer, 2 Greenlf. 272; N. H. 185;
State vs. Coatney, 8 Yerg. 210 ; Judson vs. Blanchard, 4 Conn. 557.
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conductors and hands, and safe and convenient means of egress and regress from
the line of their road. There must be no negligence on their part. There is also
on the part of the passenger an implied assent to all the company's reasonable rules
and regulations for entering, occupying and leaving their cars, and if injury befall
him by reason of his disregard of regulations which are necessary to the conduct
of the business, the company are not liable in damages, even though the negligence of their servants concurred with his own negligence in causing the mischief.
Sullivan vs. the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, 6 Casey, 234,
affirmed.
3. When a passenger leaves the cars otherwise than by a safe and convenient plat'form provided for the purpose, and death or injury results therefrom, there must
be proof of some justifying necessity for.his doing so, to excuse him from negligence and the consequences of it. A voluntary disregard of regulations provided
for his safe exit by the platform, is a disregard of his obligations to the company,
and leaves them free from liability for injuries consequent upon his act.
4. It is not negligence on the part of the company that they do not by force or barriers prevent parties from leaving the cars at the wrong side. Passengers are
presumed to act reasonably in all given contingencies.
5. The damages to which parents are entitled for proddcing the death of their son,
under the Act of 26th April, 1855, are to be estimated by the pecuniary value to
them of his services during his minority, together with expense of care and attention to the deceased arising out of the injury, funeral expenses, and medical services, if any. This excludes damages for the suffering of the deceased, which was
personal to himself and did not survive, as well as for solace, which is incapable
of appreciation so as to be compensated. This is the rule where the death was
produced by negligence, unaccompanied by wantonness, violence or gross negligence evincive of moral turpitpde. In such cases merely compensatory damages
may be exceeded. As to the rule of damages, Blake vs. Midland Railway Com- pany, 15 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 437, approved. Pennsylvania Railroad Company vs. Kelly, 7 Casey, 372, affirmed. Pennsylvania Railroad Company vs.
McCloskey's Adm'rs, 11 Harris, 526, explained.

Error to the Common Pleas of Westmoreland county.
Stokes and Clarke, for plaintiffs in error.
Cowan, for defendant in error.
A full statement of this case is given in the opinion of the court,
which was delivered at Harrisburg, May 4, 1859, by
THOMPSON, J.-This was an action brought by the defendants in
error, and plaintiffs below, against the Railroad Company, for negligently causing the death of their son Peter, whom, with his father,
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they had conveyed in their cars from Irwin's station, in Westmoreland county, to Brinton's station, in Allegheny county, where h4
was killed on the track of the company's road, by being run over
by the train going east. "The gravamen of the charge in the plaintiff's narr is, that "the company did not us& due care, diligence, and
skill, in allowing the said Peter Zebe time- and opportunity to get
off and away from the said cars, wheri they, arrived at Brinton's
station; but on the contrary, iinmediately'on .theatrival itthe said
station, and before the said Peter. had time to 'get away from 'the
said cars, the said company carelessly and negligently caused an
engine or ldcomotive to be run alongside of. the said'eari wlhich the
said Peter was attempting to leave, so that- the'said eigine or locomotive caught the said Peter,;' and passing over him; he was killed;
The case involved questions, ofnegligence 'on'the pert.'of thb company, as to proper conveniences for the.exit of passengers from the
train, and also on the part of the plaintiff and the deceased in the act
of leaving the cars; and also whether the accident occurred before
or after the relation of carrier and passenger had cemed or not. :
There seems to have been no 4ontroversy. about two facts in the
case; :1st, that'the company had a v.n-renieht jIatform.-at the station for pasiengers to leave'the carsion going west; second, that
the deceisel'and his father; instead- of leavi'ng the ears by pasing
on to the .platform, left- it on the' other side i which brought them,
immedi'.tely on ,reaching the ground, on the other'or softhern track
"
of the road.- wherd the-boy-was killed.," " "
The plaintiif'in error complain ihai several points ,put by them,
-calculated and intended to present their, viw's on the question of
-their liability mere not' sufficiently anewered by the cotlfl; so as tb
give the advantagb andbihnefit whiah'they caih the 4w 'wduld give
them under the'faits in ihb case, "-The first and. secon1 wAignim t
of error is that the court' did not .ditinetly anha eiplicifly-answer
their first point.
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IIt cannot be denied, after the many decisions upon the question,
that. an omission or refusal to answer a point*put by a party, relevant and material to the issue, is* error.' -1 S. & R. 449 ; 2: ib.
298; 6 .W. & S.58; 3 Pa..318; and in Hood vs. -Bood "ei al.,
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decided at this term, wherein the doctrine is elaborately examined.
The law of the courts requires points put to be substantially answered,
3 Barr, 244, provided always that they are relevant, and not unconnected with the facts in the case. 12 Harris, 72. There have been
many cases in which answers have been condemned for want of
sufficient perspicuity or conciseness; and this shows the importance
of preserving the rule that requires of the judge full and substantial
answers to the points. In fact, the importance of the rule cannot
be over-estimated, when we regard our short and simple pleading,
which rarely brings the law of the case on the record. The only
method in most cases a party has left to bring before the court, and
from thence to this court for review, a proposition of law, is by presenting it as a point to be charged upon; and when clearly responded
to, it greatly aids the jury in coming to conclusions in the case, or
if distinctly negatived, the party has no trouble in having it reviewed.
It is, therefore, necessary that the point, if relevant, be substantially
answered; otherwise it will be error. The qualification of the rule
to relevancy excludes, of course, abstract propositions, or such as,
if answered as prayed for, would not have benefited the party.
In looking into the testimony in the present case, we think there
was sufficient evidence to authorize the defendants to ask for instructions on the effect of it as regards the act of the plaintiff and the
deceased in leaving the cars and placing themselves on the south
track of the road. If they did voluntarily and negligently place
themselves there, when there was a safe place of exit, and the full
opportunity to make it, surely the defendants would not be liable,
as common carriers, if instead of leaving by the usual mode of stepping on the platform, they negligently and voluntarily placed themselves on the other track. This was the law of the plaintiffs' point.
It is true it was faulty in the assumption of the facts of which it
was predicated. But as to this, no objection was made by the court,
and a distinct answer was not refused for this reason. Nor could it
well have been for such a reason, as it was capable of as distinct an
answer on the law, giving at the same time the facts to the jury, as
if it had been hypothetical in form. It should have been as distinctly answered, if answered at all, as if put hypothetically. But it
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was not, and we do not find it sufficiently affirmed in relation to the
facts on which it was based in any part of the charge. True, it
might be deduced from observations in other connections and relations to other facts. But this is not quite enough. It ought to
have been answered in the relation in which it was put, somewhere.
The party was entitled to this. The jury could not, without. muc4
greater skill in construing language than generally falls to their lot,
have told whether the point was affirmed or negatived. The point
.asserted immunity to the company, if the plaintiff and his son
.voluntarily placed themselves on the other track, unless in case of
.gross negligence on the part of the company. The aaswer, instead
-of affirming this, if the facts were true, treated of the duty, of the
company to convey -safely and to provide a safe mode of exit from
the cars, and added, "if they left the train In the usual way, aid
were properly regardful of their own safety, and did everything tha
their own duty required of them, and in thu4 leaving the train an
before they found a place of safety, they were injur d by the ntgi".
fence of the company, then we think, that paosengers in that condition, although separated from the train, would have a right ,tp
recover for such negligence. This is.not the case of -. stranger,
unconnected with the train, placing limself volhntarily on the track."
This was clearly an insufficient aswer; in.fapt,-in addition to the
just complaint of insufficiency, it interduced4 an elenMiet w'hiqh it is
difficult to tell the effect of in such. a case, 4nd that was in leaving
it to be inferre. that there was no place of safety provided for leaving-the cars; fQr the .court say, ' if they did eveything ;hat duty
,equired of them in thus leaving the train, and before they found a
place of 8afei ," they were ipjured., by tle neggence of the corn.pany, a recovery might be had. From this language a jury might
.have inferred, and perhaps.,did, thct acting as carefully as. they
could, there was no place of safety provided for leaying the cars.
A. intimation like this, although not intended, might have a very
mischievous effect. This assignment of error we think is sustained.
2. The second, third and fourth assignment, like the. first, is to
the insufficiency of the answer to defendants' second point. This
,point asserted the principle. that if the accident occurred after the
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plaintiff and deceased had left the cars, the liability of common
carriers was ended, and having been killed after this, the action
could not be sustained, unless the death was the result of gross,
negligence or wanton injury. There was sufficient testimony in the
case to justify the defendants in making the point, and the court
should have given a distinct response to it, although like the last
one, it was faulty in form. Notwithstanding this, the court essayed
an answer by saying, "this point is answered in our answer to the
first point of the defendant as above." How answered-affirmatively or negatively-we cannot say; and we think a jury could not
have derived much instruction from it. As we have already said, the
party was entitled, either directly in answer to this point, or in the body
of the charge, to a distinct response to the proposition. Thegravamen
of the complaint was against the defendants as common carriers,
and as such they were counted against. If this relation had ended
when the accident occurred, the plaintiffs could not have recovered,
and the evidence shows this to have been a debatable point in the
case. A very different rule of responsibility exists where such an
accident occurs during the continuance of the relation of common
carriers, and after it has entirely ended, and it was important that
the jury should have been instructed clearly as to this, so that they
might not disregard the distinction upon the idea that the company
were answerable at all events, under the evidence, and that the
objection was merely technical. Special care is the duty of the
court in all cases where there is much to excite sympathy and lead
away the judgment from the application of well settled principles
of law. Adh.erence to these principles under all circumstances, is
the only security we can have. A disregard of them is an injury
to the people, by rendering less secure the safeguards of the law
upon whici all must rely in the hour of trouble. We think the
answer is insufficient.
The fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and tenth assignments of error
may be considered together. In their third and fourth points, the
plaintiffs in error prayed the court to charge, that as common carriers they were only bound to provide for the safe transportation of
passengers, and for their safe egress from the line of the road, and
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if in this instance they had done so, and if the plaintiff and the
deceased did not avail themselves of the mode of exit provided, but
left at an improper time, or by an improper way, the protection of
the company; ceased and if the accident occurred in consequence of
this, it was the result of the risk voluntarily assumed by them, and
being guilty of negligence themselves, they cannot recover.
In response to these prayers for instructions, the court very
properly left the fact to the determination of the jury, whether the
company had provided a safe means of transportation and the necessary platform accommodations for the safe exit or discharge of passengers, adding 1 if so, then the company had done all that could be
required of them, so far as the passenger train was concerned,",
This was all very right, but following this instruction, the court
submitted another inquiry to the jury, which it, seems to me was
inconsistent with the clear idea thus expressed, and that was, whether
the plaintiff and the deceased had "an equal right to get off the
cars on the one side or the other, or was it their duty in view of all
the circumstances to get off on the platform." And again, "if the
jury believe they had a right to get off on that side," the opposite to
the platform, and they violated no duty in doing so, then, no carelessness could be attributed to them.
The law implies in the contract of conveying passengers by railroad companies, that they shall provide a safe and sufficient road
and cars, competent and careful conductors and hands, and safe and
convenient means of egress and regress from the line of their road.
There must be no negligence on their part. There is also on the part
of the passenger an "implied contract that he will and does assent
to all the company's reasonable rules and regulations for entering,
occupying, and leaving their car, and if injury befall him by reason of his disregard of regulations which are necessary to the conducting of the business, the company are not liable in damages,
even though the negligence of their servants concurred with his ownnegligence in causing the mischief." Sullivan vs. the .Philadelphia
and Reading B. B. Co., 6 Casey, 234, per WOODWARD, J. Hereare reciprocal duties defined; resting upon principles most reason-able, and of the clearest justice, and nothing but special circum-3

RAILROAD COMPANY vs. ZEBE.

stances, or the most pressing exigencies which are now foreseen, could
justify a departure from them. Nothing of the kind marked the
case in hand. But the court submitted the question to the jury
whether the parties in this case had not a right to leave the cars,
either by the safe means provided by the company, or by a way not
provided. The abstract question of their right to do so, is one thing,
and need not be disputed, but the liability of the company by reason of their doing so is quite another thing. The regulation of the
company for leaving the cars by the platform was apparent from its
existence, and having been placed there and used for the purpose,
this was the usual egress from the train. Without proof of any
necessity, coupled with the proposition of their right to leave the
ears at either side, the jury were by the instructions of the court
allowed to find on the opposite of the principle laid down in the case
of Su~livan vs. the Philadelphia and Reading B. B. Co., which
declares that passengers are bound to conform to the regulations of
the company on "entering, occupying and leaving the cars." The
'duty being fixed by the relation of the parties to each other, the
contract must be performed by both.
A departure by either could be justified only by a paramount
necessity. The question, then, for the jury should have been, first,
as to the performance of the duty by the company in providing safe
ears, and safe means of egress from them, and secondly if this were so,
was it the fault of the company that the injury occurred, and to establish this, more was necessary to be proved than that the plaintiff and the
injured son voluntarily chose to depart from the cars by an unusual
way. There should have been proof of some existing necessity for
doing so' to excuse them from negligence, and the consequences of
it. Then the question might have been left to the jury as to the
propriety of their violating the regulations of the company. A
voluntary disregard of regulations provided for their safe exit by the
platform, was a disregard of their obligations to the company, and
if this were so, the plaintiffs ought not to recover. We hold, on
these principles, that the company's liability could not be fixed for
the injury consequent on a choice of the passenger in disregard of
the provisions made by them for his safety and convenience. It
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was, we think, error in the court, to submit the question of the right
of the parties to leave the cars at either side, in absence of the proof
of a justifying necessity in doing so. It was not negligence on the
part of the company that they did not, by force or barriers, prevent
the parties from leaving at the wrong side. People are not to be
treated like cattle; they are presumed to act reasonably in all given
contingeneies, and the company had no reason to expect anything
else in this case. There was error in this portion of the charge.
The eleventh assignment of error regards the question.of damages. The court instructed the jury on this subject, by saying, "if
the jury found for the plaintiff, the question is one for the jury
entirely. There was no prayer for instructions, yet this will not
prevent a party, dissatisfied with the charge, from having it reviewed,
and errors corrected if they exist in the charge as given. It is
obvious that this general and unrestricted reference of the question
of damages, to the jury, gave them the fullest latitude of construction in assessing them. It left them to base that assessment upon
such standard as each juror might set up for himself or any common
one that might happen to suit the feelings, tastes, or judgment of
all in the particular case, never again, perhaps, to be the rule in
any future case, however similar in circumstances. Rights should
be better defined. And although from the inherent difficulty in
estimating the value of life, when called upon to compensate for its
loss, we cannot lay down what may properly be called rules to guide
in making the estimate, yet it ii our duty to announce such principles of compensation as we think the legislature intended by the act
in question, that there may be some approximation to uniformity of
results in such cases.
The act of the 15th of April, 1851, provides "that whenever
death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence, or negligence, and
no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or
her life, the widow of such deceased, or, if there be no widow, the
personal representatives may maintain an action for and recover
damages for the death thus occasioned." The act of the 26th of
April, 1855, changed the law, so far as the personal representatives
were concerned, and conferred the right of recovery only upon
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parents for the loss of children, and upon children for the loss of
parents, and reciprocally upon husband and wife. These acts confer a new right unknown to the common law. It existed in the civil
law, and was an institution of the old Saxon code. So too, it is to
be found in the Scotish law under the head of "Assythements for
homicide." But as the compensation under all these laws rested
upon very precise regulations generally, peculiarly applicable to the
times, circumstances, estates and conditions of the deceased and the
parties entitled, we derive no lights from them.
In 1846, the statute of 9 and 10 Victoria, cap. 93 was passed in
England, providing for the recovery of damages "whensoever
the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default" against the party occasioning the same. The damages, it
has been held, are for the death of the party, as it is with us.
Under this statute, providing for compensation for the same thing
as does ours, namely, the death of the decedent, we have one case
which turns on the subject of the rule of damages. It is the case
of Blake vs. .Midland Railway Co., 15 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 437.
The case had been tried before Baron Parke, at Derbyshire Assizes,
and came before the Queen's Pench in banc on a rule to show cause
why a new trial should not be granted, on the ground of a misdirection
in regard to the principle upon which the damages should have been
assessed. In granting the new trial, the doctrine is held that the
jury, in estimating damages under that statute, "are to be confined
to injuries, of which a pecuniary estimate can be made, and cannot
take into consideration the mental suffering occasioned to the survivors by the death," and that nothing may be allowed as solatium,
that being incapable of a pecuniary estimate, nor for the sufferings
of the injured party. The difficulty of estimating the value of the
life, and the consequent damage to the survivors in the loss of it, is
conceded in the case, but the reasoning of the learned judge is forcible in illustrating the greater difficulty which would have to be
encountered in estimating damages for what cannot be measured by
any pecuniary standard, such as grief, loss of society, and the thousand nameless things which make up the estimate in which the
deceased may have been held by the survivors, entitled to damage
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under the law.

And hence the conclusion, that the provision giving

damages for the death was only such as could be tested by a pecuniary estimate, not speculative or fanciful. "The measure of damages," said the learned judge, "1is not the loss or suffering of the
deceased, but the injury resulting from his death to his family."
Our statute, although differing, in the absence of details from the
British statute is a provision for compensating precisely the same
sort of injury, the damage occasioned to the survivor by the death
of the deceased, and hence we may avail ourselves of the light shed
upon the subject by the learned court in the case cited. In England,
under this construction of their statutes, damages seldom exceed one
or two hundred pounds sterling. One great merit in the rule and
what undoubtedly was the legislative intent, there as with us, is that
it is a rule of equality, compensating the rich and poor, the refined
and cultivated, and those less so, by the simple standard of pecuniary loss.
The case of the Pennsyflvania Railroad Co. vs. M'C-skey'8
administrators,11 Harris 526, while it adheres to the rule of giving
damages only upon such bases as are susceptible of a pecuniary estimate, seems to regard the value of the life lost as the basis of the
estimate, rather than the injury resulting from it to the survivor
entitled to sue. This conclusion flowed from the form of, and parties
to the action, and naturally led to the result. It was a suit by the
personal representatives for the benefit of the estate. Treated in
this light, and as the plaintiffs, the administrators, were not damaged
by the death, but were recovering for the estate, the only estimate,
it seems to me, thait could be made, was of the value of the life.
The wrong done to it survived by virtue of the statute, to the estate,
and gave the personal representatives their right of recovery
co-extensively with its value. But for some reason, a wise one
of course, this law was in 1855 altered, and the right to sue was
conferred on parents for the loss of children, and children for parents,
and reciprocally between husband and wife. This was a new and
independent right, given by positive law, not cast by survivorship
as for an injury to the decedent. It is for the wrong done to them.
In this view of the law, we think the rule which should have been
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observed in this case, differs from that in the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. .11' Closkey's administrators,and more resembles the case
of a father suing for injury to his child. In the case of the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. Kelly, 7 Casey, 372, the rule of damages
in such a case was considered; and in delivering the opinion of the
court, Mr. Justice WOODWARD says, "the damages must be compensatory merely, and that compensation must have regard to the
plaintiff's loss of his services, and to the expense of nursing and
medical treatment." "The father was entitled to the services of
his child during minority, and by just so much as this injury impaired
the value of this right, was he entitled to compensatory damages,"
and it was added "that it was proper for the jury to understand,
that the suffering endured by the boy, and the disfiguration of his
form, and whatever was merely personal to him, should not enter
into the father's damages, because for them the son would have a
right of action." This is a rule on a very kindred subject, and is
scarcely distinguishable from cases like the present, except in extent
of injury, and is in essence the principle of the cases already cited.
From the authorities and reasons given, the jury, instead of the
unrestrained license given them in the charge, in the assessment
of damages, should have been instructed that if the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover, it was for the damage done in producing the
death of their son, and this was to be estimated by the pecuniary
value to them of his services during his minority, together with
expenses of care and attention to the deceased, arising out of the
injury, funeral expenses, and medical services, if any. This is the
only pecuniary damage done to them, and this the law allows them
to recover, if entitled on the facts to recover at all. This excludes
damages for the suffering of the deceased, which was personal to
himself and did not survive, as well as for solace, which are incapable of appreciation so as to be compensated. No money could be
the measure of the affliction, no road great or small, but would fall
beneath the weight of such a rule if applied, and for an injury happening by a mere oversight, amounting of course to negligence by
some agent in the transit of the cars, it would be a severe penalty
to visit the company with extravagant and exterminating damages.
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But they should be held to a strict accountability to the extent that
a fair interpretation of the statute will allow. In making the estimate of the value of the life, and consequent damage by the death,
much is still left to the sound discretion of the jury. Whatever is
susceptible of a pecuniary estimate is included within it, and what
we have seen was not to be included must be excluded. We are
speaking only of cases of death by negligence, unaccompanied by
wantonness, violence or gross negligence, evincive of moral turpitude.
In such cases no doubt but merely compensatory damages may be
exceeded. It is not intended to vary the rule on this subject existing in case of other personal wrongs, but leave it with such attendant circumstances, to the sound discretion of courts and juries.
The thirteenth assignment'of error is to the rejection of Shattuck
as a ivitness. We are not convinced that there was error in this
ruling, nor is it material to decide the matter, for, as the case goes
back for a re-trial, the company will perhaps think it their duty to
avoid an exception on this ground by executing a 'elease to him.
The other assignments of error not noticed are not sustained, but
for the reasons given, this judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed and venire deanovo awarded.

In the Supreme Court of Texas-Tyler Term, 1858.
JOSEPH HANCOCK ET AL.) APPELLANTS vs. WM. B. LUTLER, APPELLEE.
A gift of slaves to one "for the term of his natural life, and at his death to his

lawful issue forever," vests in him a life estate only.

The following opinion' was delivered by
J.-Appellants claim the slaves in controversy as the
children of Joseph Hancock, deceased, under the deed of their
grandfather, John Hancock, which reads as follows:
ROBERTS,

"SOUTH

CAROLINA,

.Edgefidd .District.
'Know all men by these presents that I, John Hancock, of the&State and District
aforesaid, for and in consideration of the love and natural affection I bear unto and
I This opinion will appeai in the 21st volume of Texas Reports.
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for my beloved son Joseph Hancock, and for his better support and future convenience, have this day given the following property to the said Joseph Hancock, in
the following manner, viz: I give unto said Joseph Hancock two negroes, viz:
Jerry, a boy, dark complexion, about eighteen years old, and one girl, Ann, dark
complexion, about seven years of age, and for the term of his naturallife,
and at his
death, to his lawful issue forever."

[Then follows a full warranty "unto said Joseph H ancock and
his lawful issue."]
Under this deed, appellants claim as purchasers from John Hancock; and their right so to do depends upon whether or not
Joseph Hancock took a life estate only in the slaves-and that is
the question in this case.
What did the grantor intend by the terms of his deed? Was
that intention lawful ? These are the leading inquiries to be made.
The governing rule is-that every part of the instrument should be
harmonized, and given effect to, if it can be done. If that cannot
be done, and it is found that the deed contains inherent conflict of
intentions-then the main intention, the object of the grant being
considered, shall prevail. In either event the result arrived at
must be a lawful one. See Rules in Sheppard's Touch., 83, 84,
and 85. In arriving at the intention of the grantor, what he had
a right to do, and what he did not have a right to do, should be
taken into consideration: for it is to be presumed that he knew his
rights, unless we find something in the deed which leads to a different conclusion. He bad a right to give his son the property absolutely, either with 6r without reference to his issue. He had a
right to give to his son Joseph a life estate-only, and connect with
it a gift of the absolute property, to take effect at the time of
Joseph's death, to persons then in being, answering the description
of Joseph's issue.
He had no right to create a perpetuity, by which he would tie
up the property from alienation longer than a life or lives in being,
and twenty-one years.
Ie had no right to entail the property by giving it to Joseph
and his issue, to take in a line of succession after one another contrary, to the general laws of descent and distribution.
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He had no right (terms are used applicable to real estate, so as
to convey the idea,) to reduce the estate conferred on Joseph to a
life estate, if in the same deed he made the issue of Joseph derive
an estate in fee or fee-tail from and through Joseph as his heirs
by descent.
Now if this deed, or its parts, are equally capable of two constructions-one, consistent with his having intended to do that
which it was lawful for him to do,-and one, which is consistent
with his having intended to do that which it was unlawful for him
to do-the former will be adopted.
The part of the deed, which expressly indicates the interest
which Joseph Hancock is intended to take, is plain and not even
capable of being made dubioui-" I give unto Joseph Hancock (the
slaves) for the term of his natural life." If the deed went no further, or if the full property in the slaves had been given, after that,
by the same or another deed, over to the issue of some one else,
there could be no doubt that Joseph only took a life estate.
•It is contended by the counsel for appellee, in an elaborate argument
that this express intention is overborne, and a greater interest than
a life estate was conferred on Joseph Hancock by the mode in
which the interest in the property is bestowed on the issue, viz:
IIat his death to his issue forever;" that, by the use of these words
in the deed, he has done (whatever he might- have intended) some
one or all of the three things above designated which he had no
right to do-and that therefore the only legal result which can
flow from the deed, so as to give it effect at all, is to cast upon
Joseph Hancock the absolute property in the slaves.
To effect this, the rule in iShelley's case is mainly relied on.
That is stated to be--" when a person takes an estate of freehold,
legally or equitably, under a deed, will, or other writing, and, in
the same instrument, there is a limitation, by way of remainder,
,either with or without the interposition of another estate., of an
interest of the same legal or equitable quality, to hisheirs, or heiri
of his body, as a class of persons to take in succession from generation to generation,-the limitation to the heirs entitles the ancestor
to the whole estate," 4 Kent, 215. This result would follow,
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although the deed might express that the first taker should have a
life estate only. It is founded on the use of the technical words,
"heirs," or "heirs of his body," in the deed; or the will.
The rule in Shelley's case is said to be a rule of law. It is
really an organic rule, entering into the creation of the estate of
inheritance. The whole must embrace all its parts. The existence
of the whole being established, or taken for granted, it cannot be
true that a part of the whole is wanting-that is, if it takes four
sides to complete a mansion, its completion being admitted, by a
law in physics it cannot be true that the mansion has three sides
only. In that sense it is a rule of law.
Without attempting a severely accurate definition, but for purposes of illustration, it may be said-that the law does not permit
a grantor to create an inheritableestate-divide it up into sections
of certain or uncertain periods-and fasten a section thereof upon
the first taker with the reduced dimensions of a life estate only.
That is in violation of the rule by which an inheritable estate is
created. For if a life estate only be clearly granted to the first
taker, (as Joseph Hancock in this case) from all the terms of the
deed taken together, then his heirs cannot inherit the estate from
him, and it cannot be truly said that he takes an inheritable estate.
The fact, on the other hand, of its being an estate descending to his
heirs in succession, is inconsistent with the fact of the first taker's
having a life estate only, and, therefore, if it appears, from the
deed, that it is by descent from the first taker that certain persons,
as his heirs, must derive their title,-then that forces back on him
(that from which alone such a result could flow) an inheritable
estate with all its attributes; although other parts of the deed
might indicate an effort to confer on the first taker a life estate
only.
We are brought to the point then-do the terms of the deed
"and, at his death, to his lawful issue forever," standing in the
connection they do, give the property to persons in being at the
time of Joseph's death, answering the description of Joseph's issue,
they taking as purchasers ? or do they give the property to "the
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heirs of his body," as a class of persons to take in succession from
generation to generation, which would be by inheritance?
The word issue being the leading feature of this sentence, upon
which all the rest concentrates, it is important to fix some definite
meaning to it. It may mean descendants living at the death of
the first taker, or descendants through all future time so long as
there are any; it may mean " heirs of the body," or it may mean
children. The first point, to be settled, is into whose hands will
the property first go, after the death of Joseph Hancock, and in
what proportions, so far as can be gathered from the words lawful
issue as they stand in the deed.
It is said, the word issue, when not restrained by the context,
is co-extensive and synonymous with descendants, comprehending
objects of every.degree. And here the distribution is per capita,
and not per 8tirpes. This is supported by four cases. 2 Jarman
on Wills, 25, 26; 8 Vesey, 257; applying both to personal and
real estate, and it is said there is no authority to -the contrary.
The cases. are, Davenport vs. ifanbury; Freeman vs. P)asley;
,ooke vs. Cooke; Leigh vs. .Norbury. The last case was a deed
of settlement of personal property for A. during his life, and after
his decease, for his lawful issue. 2 Jarm. Wills, 25.
The general rules of property, respecting legal and trust estates
being the same, (Fearne, 144, 132, 183, 136;) this case, if admitted in all its bearings, would be a strong case in favor of Joseph
Hancock having taken a life estate. For, if at his death all his
descendants were to take'per capita, they would not be either the
heirs of his body, or his distributees; that is, not necessarily or
usually so. That would present the case of a child and grandchild, and even great-grand-child, all living and each taking an
equal part, which would of course be variant from any known laws
of inheritance, or distribution. And where those that are to take
dare not the same as those who would be heirs, or heirs of the body,
a life estate is created, and the rule does not apply. Fearne 148,
Cheek vs. Day; id. Archers' case.
That interpretation of the word issue is founded on its literal
meaning, standing by itself. But how can the word be thus isolated
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when it is placed in a deed? If connected with no words that
explain or qualify it, it stands in connection with the general
objects of the deed. Valuable property is given-it is given to
some person; that person is pointed out by a word capable of being
understood to relate to several different persons, or classes of persons. To arrive at what person was intended, it is but fair to
ascertain to whom men have generally given under such circumstances, who have specially designated the objects of their gift.
It is presumed it would be difficult to find one case where a man
had expressly given his property to all his descendants, to take
per calita-children, grand-children, great-grand-children, &c.
The general sense of the -American mind, as exhibited in deeds,
wills, and in statutes of descent and distribution, is that it is proper
to give property to children, grand-children, &c., they taking per
stirpes. So we may well presume, in this case, that such persons
were meant. They would be the same persons usually designated
by the words "heirs of the body." It does not follow, however,
that this sentence, with the word issue in it, means the same thing
in this deed as it would hive ineant if "heirs of the body" had been
inserted in its stead. For the words "heirs," and "heirs of the
body," in England, where both estates in fee and in fee tail exist,
have a fixed legal meaning. They are the appropriate and necessary words to create those estates. A legal implication arises from
them, when used in a deed, over and above their import to designate
particular persons; which is, that the estate is to pass from person
to person through succeeding generations, in regular succession.
So that it may be said they have a double import-one, an import
of designation; the other, an import of inbeliitance. Strictly speaking, they never did have this "import of inheritance" with reference to personal property, for that could not be inherited.
In the states that have inhibited entailment, the words "heirs of
the body" are not strictly technical, because they are not appropriate words to create any estate recognized by law. Jarvis et al. vs.
Wyatt, 4 Hawks' N. 0. Rep. 227. In this state it is not even
necessary to use the word "heirs," to create an estate in fee.
From their indiscriminate use, however, with a recognized meaning
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derived from the common law, they would generally be understood
to bear their fall import in reference to both species of property.
Choicevs. Marshall,1 Kelly, 97; Kay vs. Connor, 8 Humphries, 68.
If a deed or will contain a gift, as in one of the cases just cited,
of slaves "to M. F. during her natural life, and to the heirs of her
body forever," this is tantamount to the expression, "to M. F.,
during her natural life, and such descendants as the law points out
to inherit her estate, and who shall hereby take the said slaves by
inheritance from M. F." Here, at once, is presented, by, the use
of the technical 'words "heirs of the body," (when fully interpreted
and both of its imports delineated,) a conflict between the first proposition, that M. F. shall .take a life estate, and the second proposition, that the descendants shall take by inheritance from M. F.
No sort of construction can reconcile them. It would not do to
say, the words "heirs of the body" ehall be understood in their
"import of designation" *only, in which case there would not be a
conflict. That would not be reconciliation-it would be rejection;
it would reject a part, and the most important part, of the meaning
of the words fixed by law. If one must be rejected, why reject the
first proposition rather than the second? Because it will confer
the greater estate on M. F. The courts will construe a deed. to
confer the greatest estate on the grantee that the terms of the grant
will permit. For instance, if an estate be granted without any
limitation to heirs, and without any period of enjoyment being specified, it will be taken that a freehold for the life of the grantee has
been conveyed to him. 2 Blackstone, 94. By rejecting the first
proposition, and retaining the second, an estate in fee tail, instead
of a life estate, is conferred upon the first taker, and his heirs take
by inheritance. Selley'a Case, and cases cited in 4 Kent, 214.
Though against the general rule, "heirs of the body" may be,
and often have been used with their "import of designation." The
English cases in which the general rule is discussed are too numerous to cite. Chancellor Kent, after a review of them, says, (4 vol.
228,) "all the modern cases contain one uniform language, and
declare that the words 'heirs of the body,' whether in deeds or
wills, are construed as words of limitation, unless it clearly and
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.unequivocally appears that they were used to designate certain individuals answering the description of heirs at the death of the
party." It will be found, however, that in some of the states the
rule has been abolished by statute; (Massachusetts, New York,
Connecticut, and perhaps others) and although it has been geneerally recognized, the current of decisions, in the American states
where it has not been abolished, bears strongly against enforcing it,
unless in cases coming strictly under the rule. They more readily
seize hold of any qualifying or superadded words, varying the sense
of the technical terms, in order to make them words of designation,
than is done in England. English cases of Jeson vs. TWright and
Atkinson vs. Featherston, given in 2 Jarman on Wills, 285. American cases: Prescott vs. Prescott'8 Heirs, 10 B. Monroe, 56;
Kemp vs. Daniel, 8 Geo. 385; and Newell vs. Newell et al.,
9 Sm. & Marsh. 56. See, also, 3 Iredell, 200, and 4 Hawks' N. C.
227, opinion by Judge Henderson; 9 Ala. Rep. 719, opinion by
Ch. J. Collier.
This difference is to be attributed somewhat to the political connections of the subject in each country. . England, originally resting on its feudal basis, fostered the strength of the parts, and therefrom anticipated the strength of the whole, by an accumulation and
perpetuation of property in families. The crown was not in this
policy, nor was commerce. The judges, receiving their power from
the crown, waged a perpetual war against it. Hence, then, the
construction of the-statute de donis-their restriction of perpetnities-and the enforcing and expanding the rule in Shelley's case
with continually increasing rigidity. In the American states, perpetuities, entailments, and the right of primogeniture were generally prohibited by their written constitutions; and the antagonism
of classes never having existed here, the public mind was at ease on
the subject of the encroachments of the power of property. Hence
our decisions have not always kept pace with the English decisions
in disregarding the qualifying words which formerly, in their own
courts, took the case out of the rule. See the opinion of Chief
Justice Marshall, 10 B. Monroe, 56, in which he adheres to for-
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mer decisions, and declines to follow the then late English case of
Jesson vs. Wright.
These remarks are made, not in a spirit of opposition to the rule,
for it is believed that the rule should be enforced ; because it is the
is founded in sound policy. It must be observed
law, and because it,
and followed whenever, and as long as the words "heirs of the
body" preserve their double import, both of designation and inheritance. We are now prepared to enter on the question-does the
word issue, ex vi termini possess the double import which is embodied in the words teirs of the body P Investigation will show that
it does not. From its generally comprehending the same clags of
persons that are the heirs of the body, it is frequently used in
that sense, and will be so construed to effect the object of the deed

or will.
In the case of Cooper vs. Collins, Lord Kenyon observed "that
issue was either a word of purchase or of limitation, as would best
answer the intention of the devisor, though in case of a deed it is
universally taken as a word of purchase." 1 Durn. & East, 299.
So in regard to the word ' children,' Lord Hardwicke remarked, "it
must be allowed that children, in their natural import, are words of
purchase, and not of limitation, unless it is to comply with the
intention of the testator, where the words cannot take effect any
other way." 2 Jar. 226. The same may be said of the words,
"child," "son" and "daughter."
Gould, J., said that the word
issue "comprehends the whole generation, as well as the words
heirs of the body; and, in his judgment, were more properly words
of limitation than words of purchase." Lord Talbot said that
",isgue is not, even in legal construction, so appropriate a word of
limitation as the word heirs." Fearne, 149. In Backhouse vs.
Wells, it is said that "it is to be remembered that the word issue
itself, even unattended with any engrafted words of limitation, is
often a word of purchase, where the word heirs is not." Fearne,
153. In King vs. Burchill, it was said by Lord Keefe Hewley,
"that the word issue was naturally a word of purchase; that the
intent was to be collected from the whole will." In the case of
Knight vs. Ellis, Lord Thurlow said, "the word issue, used in a
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will, certainly is considered as creating an estate tail, because the
context puts on the word an import which it has not naturally; but
in a feoffment it is not a word of limitation." Fearne, 490. See
also, 4 Yes. Jr. 794; 5 Yes. Jr. 259; 1 Yes. Jr. 142, and notes
to 151, 152.
But one out of the many American cases will be referred to. In
the case of Horne vs. .Lyeth, decided in Maryland, cited with
marked approbation by Chancellor Kent, it is said by Oh. J. Dorsey, "the word issue in grants was exclusively a word of purchase."
4 Kent, 230.
The word issue may be definite or indefinite: definite, when it
means all descendants of one generation; indefinite, when it means
all descendants of a series of generations; and when the context
puts on the word "an import which it has not naturally," by substituting it for the words "heirs of the body," it bears neither of
these two meanings, but is a constrained compound of parts of both.
The word issue, used in its natural sense, whether definite or
indefinite, points to the same persons in all countries. "Heirs of
the body" points to different persons in different countries, just
according to the variance in their laws of descent. The words,
children, child, son, daughter, have not the double signification of
definite and indefinite import possessed by the word issue, and
therefore cannot so readily be pressed into the service of and substituted for heirs of the body, as the word issue. And that is all
the difference between them. None of them have-that artificial signification fixed by law and variant with the laws of each country,
as that attaching to " heirs of the body." Their substitution is
the work of construction, founded on presumed intention, arising
out of the whole context of the deed or will ; not in contradiction
to and violation of their terms. 2 Jarman on Wills, 240 and note "f" and 241.
On this subject, Lord Thurlow says, in the case of Knight vs.
.lig, given in Fearne, 490, note: "Now what do the cases come
to ? A man devises by his will to A. for life; there being plainly
an intent only for life given; if that were all, the disposition would
end there as to A., and any other would be effectual after his death.

HANCOCK vs. BUTLER."

The testator then gives the same fund over to B., after a failure of
issue of A. What is the court to do ? It is clear a life interest
only is given to A. It is clear that there is no benefit given to B.
while there is any issue of A. The consequence is, that, as no
interest springs to B., and no express estate is given after the death
of A., the intermediate interest would be undisposed of, unless A.
were considered as taking for the benefit of his issue as well as
himself; and as the words in this case are capable of such amplification, the court naturally implies an intention in the testator that
A. should so take, that the property might be transmissible through
him to his issue, and he was therefore considered as taking an
estate tail, which would descend on his issue. Now an estate in
chattels is not transmissible to the issue in the same manner as
real estate, nor capable of any kind of descent; and therefore an
estate in chattels, so given from the necessity of the thing, gives
the whole interest to the first taker; but if the testator, -without
leaving it to the necessary implication, gives the fund expressly to
the issue, they are not driven to the former rule, but the issue may
take as purchasers; and then there is an end of the enlargement,
of any kind, of the estate of the tenant for life; for another estate
isgiven after his death, to other persons who are to take by purchase; it no longer rests on conjecture." It may be added, that
there is no room left for construction. Thb life estate is expressly
given to the first taker ; the absolute property is expressly given to
his issue; they stand in harmony together; there is no inherent
import of inheritance in the word issue, standing alone, which
would make it necessary to reject a part of the deed, to wit: that
part giving expressly the life estate, as would be the case if"heirs
of the body\ alone were so used.
The rule, then, that courts will confer the greatest estate on the
grantee that the terms of the grant will permit, must necessarily
be subordinate to the rule "that every part of the deed should be
"harmonized and given effect to, if it can be done."
If, then, in this gift to Joseph Hancock, "for the term of his
natural life, and at his death to his lawful issue forever," the word
issue can be read as a designation of persons, to take at his
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death, every word and sentence of the deed will be given effect
to, and both Joseph, and those persons after him, will take as purchasers.
To presume it to have been used in another sense, is to erase out
of the deed one whole sentence plainly expressed, to wit, "for the
term of his natural life," and to make the donor do that which is in
violation of law, in making an estate tail; which will not be readily
presumed, (see 15 Geo. R. 145-6,) and is in direct violation of the
manifest intention of the donor. And all this upon a presumption
that issue is used in a sense "which it has not naturally." Moss
vs. Shelden, 3 Watts & S. 160.
The word forever is the only part of the deed which could give
any plausibility to the view, that issue was used as a word of limita,tion. But, upon weighing all the words of both parts of the gift, it
will be seen that it relates to the property given, and not to the perzons taking; as the amount of interest given to Joseph, to wit,
a life .estate, was expressed by words of time, viz: "for the term
of his natural life," so the amount of interest given to the issue, to
wit, the absolute property, was also expressed by a word of time,
viz- "forever."
'Were it dubious, whether forever related to the property or the
'persons, the rules we have laid down would favor the construction
,that has been given, as it would best give effect to all the words of
:the deed, and reject none. Again, if a different view be taken,
"forever" will come in conflict with the words "at his death."
Apply "forever" to the persons, and the gift extends itself to
-them from generation to generation throughout all time, (and
creates an estate tail, if' such a thing were lawful,) and that would
be wholly in conflict with the idea expressed in the deed, that
the gift is to exhaust itself on persons at his death. The words
at his death, have always been held to be extremely pertinent and
of controlling force to indicate the persons to take as purchasers.
(See case of Warman vs. Seaman, cited in Fearne, 495 ; also Payne
vs. Stratton, id. 493, 2 Jarman, 240, and note, id. 360; see also
Kent's Rule, 4 Kent, 228 ; see Statute of 1837, in England, making
other words to be construed at his death, 2 Jarman, 296.)
This applies equally in gifts directly to issue, as well as in
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limitations over, after failure of issue, at the death of the first
taker-which is a gift to the issue by implication. Besides cases
above, see Leigh vs. Norbury, 13 Yes. Jr. 338 ; 9 Ala. R. 719,
opinion by Ch. J. Collier; 3 Iredell, 200; 4 Hawk, 227; 8 Geo.
885; Kemp vs. Daniel,'6 Serg. & Rawle, 28; 2 id. 59; 4 Iredell,
93; Dudley, 207; 10 B. Monroe, 188; 16 Johnson, 881; 10
Geo. 495; Carltonvs. Price, 9 Ala. 135; Dun vs. Davis, 4 Monroe, 223.
If these principles be established, the issue of Joseph Hancock
took as purchasers at his death.
An analogous authority in support of the whole case is Leigh vs.
Norbury, (in 1807,) 13 Yes. Jr. 338, which is a case of marriage
settlement relative to personal property, and which was a settlement
to "H. W. during his natural life, and from and immediately after
his decease (subject to an appointment which was never made, and
in default thereof,) to his lawful issue." H. W. had made a will
before he made this settlement. It was held by Sir W. Grant that
all his issue took under the settlement, notwithstanding the will,
which, it is submitted, could not have been the case if the right to
the property had returned to him, or rather had never left him, by
force of the words "lawful issue" in the deed.
The English case relied on by appellee's counsel, (Roe & Doom
vs. Grew, 2 Jarm. 245,) is a devise to G. for his natural life, and
after his decease to the use of male issue, and for want of such,
over, &c. Held, that it created an estate tail, on the ground that
as long as he had male issue the estate should not go over. The
strongest case found is Attorney General vs. Bright, 2 Jar. 353,
where the gift was to A. during her life and then to her issue, but
in case of her death without issue, then over, &c. Held, that the
property vested in A. upon the same ground as in the preceding
case. It is evident that in neither of these cases were the words
used construed to mean failure of issue at his death. Mr. Fearne
495) gays: "A limitation of a term to A. and to her issue, it
seems, vests the whole in A., if the devise rests there; though the
addition of the subsequent words-and if A. die, and leave no
issue-Lord Hardwicke said,- related to any child living at A's
death; and consequently the word issue there was considered as a
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word of purchase." The great controversy has been, not the effect
of the words "at his death," in this connection, but what words
were tantamount thereto. (2 Jarm. 240.) And to obviate the difficulty, a declaratory statute was enacted in England in 1837, (2 Jar.
296.) Before this statute, it had got to be the case that few expressions could be framed that would be held to be of similar
import to that conveyed by "at the death." And it must have
been under that view that the case of KYingsland vs. Bapelye
and wife, (3 Edwards' Ch. R. 1, N. Y.) was decided. The words
there, were "to D. T. E. during the term of her natural life, and
upon her decease unto the lawful issue of D. T. E., his, her and
their heirs, &c., forever, equally to be divided among them, share
and share alike." The Vice Chanceller -held that the property
vested in the first taker absolutely. His opinion rests upon King
vs. 3relling, 1 Ventris, 225, and Bose vs. Crew, 2 Wils. 222, to
establish that the words "lawful issue" in that will, stood in the
place and had the same force as the words "heirs of the body."
In both of those cases the words "after his decease," were used,
and no reference is made to the difference that might exist between
such words and the words used in the will before him, viz : "upon
her decease," and they are therefore treated as amounting to the
same. In that point of view, then, this case stands upon the same
ground as the cases already disposed of, (one of them being the
same.) Further, his opinion rests upon l'og vs. Meg, 1 Mer. 654,
and Jesson vs. Wright, 2 Bligh. R. 1, to reject the superadded
words "to be equally divided among them, share and share alike,"
in the will before him, as furnishing no reliable indication that
the testator had in his mind a designationof persons when he used
the words lawful issue. The case of Hog vs. Mog, has the same
words already commented on-" after the decease" of such child
or children. The case of Jesson vs. Wright not only had the words
after his decease, but also "heirs of his body" in the will, upon the
force of which the words "share and share alike," were rejected as
inconsistent with the legal effect of the technical words, heirs of the
body. It is sufficient, without further notice of the four cases upon
which that decision is based, to say that none of them conflict with
this case, in which the words used are "at his death."
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A case very strongly in point, in favor of the view we take is
Carlton vs. Price, 10 Geo. R. 496. The words in the will are
"to C. during his natural life and at his death to the lawfully
begotten heirs of his body, &c.; if C. shall die without an heir,
then the negroes to be set free at his death." Warner, J., in delivering the opinion, lays great stress upon the time when the
bequest should be consummated-at his death-in determining that
even "heirs of his body" were used to designate persons to take as
purchasers. The same is decided in Kemp vs. Daniel, 8 Geo. R.
885. A case strikingly in contrast with the case from 3 Edwards,
above cited, is 9 Ala. R. 719, in which the words are "to M . F.
during her natural life, and at her death to the lawful issue of her
body that may then be living, share and share alike, &c., forever."
The Chief Justice in delivering the opinion, held that the issue took
by purchase, and said It is manifest that the estate should vest in
her heirs at her death.
But one more case will be stated, which is Newell vs. Newell et
al., 9 Sine. & Mar. 56, which is made on a will executed in the State
of South Carolina, (where this deed was made,) and based on a full
review of the decisions of that State. The words are, "I ' give and
bequeath to my daughter, Mary, a negro, &c., to her and the heirs
of her body-during her life. Should she die without an heir, her
part to go to her brothers." Justice Clayton held that the limitation over to her brothers was not too remote, and it follows as a
consequence of this that Mary took only a life estate. To support
this case upon principle, to the words "should die without an heir,"
must be added by iuiplication living at the time of her death. As
strong cases as this are quoted from South Carolina, the last and
most extreme one of which was sustained by a divided court only.
But the one upon which they mainly rest their decision, is very pertinent to this case in one respect; the words of which are "to M.
and her heirs," and in another part of the will "if one or more ofmy children should die without issue, then his, her, or their part
shall be equally divided between the surviving brethren." Upon
which Justice Clayton remarks: "No difference is perceived between this and the present, unless in the use of the word surviving,

HANCOCK vs. BUTLER.

as indicating the period at which the limitation was to take effect.
In this case the property is to go to the brothers; the intention is
equally manifest, as if the word surviving had been inserted."
Other cases may be cited showing that not only the time at which
the gift is to take effect, but also superadded words of qualification
may be considered in determining whether or not the word "heirs
of the body" are used as a designation of persons to take as purchasers, especially in cases concerning personal property. (10 B.
Monroe, 56, Prescott vs. Prescott's heirs; Swain vs. Roscoe, 3 Iredell, 200; Jarvis, et al. vs. Wyatt, 4 Hawk, 227 ; 12 Ala. Rep.
135, in Dunn et al. vs. Davis.) These American cases are brought
forward, not for indiscriminate adoption, but to make manifest, by
the current of decisions, that the taking effect of the gift at the death
of the first taker, is an important fact in favor of the persons being
designated as purchasers, even where the technical words "heirs of
the *body," are used, and more controlling, of course, when the word
issue is used. The case of Polk et al. vs. Farris,(9 Yerg. 210,)
cited for appellee, does not stand in the way of this decision. Its
application to this case is upon the assumption, not admitted, that
lawful issue in this deed, means the same as though it were written.
"heirs of the body."
The reasons, then, that this case does not come under the rule in
Shelly's case, are,
1st. The technical words on which the rule is founded-" heirs,"
or "heirs of the body"-are not used in the deed.
2d. The word issue, (without -straining it out of its appropriate
signification,) which is used, may be understood in a sense not conflicting with that part of the deed which gives Joseph Hancock a
life estate 'only, and to give effect to the whole, it will be taken to
have been used in that sense.
3d. The gift to the issue at the death of Joseph, is strongly indicative that the word issue was used in the sense of designation of
persons theft to take the absolute property, which would make them
take as purchasers.
What is decided now, is-that the words "lawful issue," as they
stand in this deed, are words of purchase, and not of limitation.
No other question having been made, none other will be decided.

